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In re Popular Democratic Party, et al
No. 98-2135 (C.A. 1st Cir)
Oral Arguments
November 3, 1998
San Juan, Puerto Rico
Today, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit convened
in San Juan, Puerto Rico to hear the above referenced case. The panel of
Judges was presided by Circuit Judge STAHL, who was joined by Circuit Judges
LYNCH and LIPIZ.
ATTORNEY LINO SALDAÑA argued on behalf of the Petitioner.
At the outset he defined the issues as 1) Whether the lower Federal Court
was clearly wrong when it assumed jurisdiction in this case and 2) Whether
mandamus was the correct remedy? He began his argument by asserting
that the instant challenge to the Plebiscite Law in the Superior court of
Puerto Rico is based on six causes of action, all made under the Constitution
of Puerto Rico, and that the Federal District Court in Puerto Rico erroneously
assumed jurisdiction under causes of action One and Five. The gist of the
challenge is that the Plebiscite Law does not allow Commonwealth supporters
their properly defined option.
Judges LYNCH and LIPIZ pressed him on the numerous references in the
Plebiscite Law to the U.S. Constitution and to various Acts of Congress.
They wondered whether those references required the consideration of federal
authority by any Court reviewing the Law, and if so, was not such a consideration
a task for which the federal courts are best suited. SALDAÑA insisted
they did not because no federal authority was being directly challenged.
In any case, he argued, the question here was not a "substantial"
question because the Congress had not shown sufficient interest in this
matter by passing complete legislation. When asked whether an "incomplete
expression" (House bill only) by Congress, by itself, indicates a "substantial"
question, he answered no. He did not argue the mandamus issue.
Attorney JOSÉ FUENTES AGOSTINI argued for the Respondent.
He began by asserting that this is the perfect case to apply the "substantial"
federal question doctrine because at issue in this case were matters arising
under the Territorial Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Public Law 600 and
the Treaty of Paris -- all of which are matters exclusively under the jurisdiction
of federal authority. Judge LYNCH wondered whether Congress had, in fact,
already acted and passed this matter on to Puerto Rico. The Attorney General
replied that such transfer had occurred, but only for matters of local self-rule.
The plenary power to decide the political relationship between the United
States and Puerto Rico remained, as it always has, exclusively in federal
hands.
Judges LYNCH and LIPIZ forcefully pressed the Attorney General on whether
the Plebiscite Law could ever be considered a "substantial" question
in light on the non-binding nature of the results. Since neither the Congress,
nor anyone else is bound by the results, how can it raise a "substantial"
federal question. The AG conceded the Plebiscite results were non-binding,
but that a "substantial" federal question was still present because
the results will be trumpeted by those seeking to resolve the political
status issue one way or another. "So," asked Judge LYNCH, "even
though it is advisory, it will have a future effect?"
"That's right," answered the AG, arguing that like the case
of Smith v. Kansas, there is a substantial federal question here, because
the heart of the issues raised goes to the exercise of exclusively federal
power. Judge LIPIZ wondered what guidance the P.R. Constitution could give
on the Plebiscite definitions. The AG answered none, because only federal
authority (Congress) may define the political options available to Puerto
Rico - a fact recognized by the Puerto Rican delegates who participated
in the Law 600 process. The AG concluded by responding to questions regarding
the Fifth Option, clarifying that the option did not include the PDP alone
(which is why no one group could spend public monies in support).
In conclusion, it appears that the PDP's argument that no federal question
is raised will fail. However, the "substantial" question standard
may not be met because of the non-binding, purely advisory nature of the
Plebiscite results.
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